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Abstract
This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital
investment is ﬁnanced in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’
inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy
position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome,
i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing ﬁrms on a regular basis.
This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between
the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy ex-
planations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle,
providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some Latin-
American countries in the late seventies and early nineties.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we propose a dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy
suﬀering from the soft budget constraint (SBC) syndrome. This phenomenon,
initially analyzed by Kornai (1986) in the study of transition economies, is charac-
terized by the survival of ineﬃcient ﬁrms thanks to the ﬁnancial support of other
institution. The softening of budget constraints, however, may occur without any
external support but as the result of asymmetric information in a borrower-lender
relationship. Indeed, it may be the case that reﬁnancing bad projects is in the
lender’s best business interest. Such a situation may arise whenever a lender has
initially funded a project which type was not known at the contracting stage.
When some information about the quality of the project is revealed, and given
the sunk nature of the initial funding, lenders may want to extend extra funding
to allow the project to be ﬁnished, so as to minimize losses.
This second rationale for softness is the one chosen in this paper. Of course,
we do not rule out there are political factors implying that ineﬃcient ﬁrms are al-
lowed to survive (Kornai’s original explanation), but we consider economic factors
are, in some contexts, enough to show the existence of the syndrome.
Indeed, there has been evidence of it in some Latin American countries. It
is the case of Uruguay and Argentina during the late seventies, in the context of
ﬁnancial liberalization processes and the international bonanza in capital mar-
kets. In that period, bank lending has gone through a great expansion and there
is evidence that project screening and monitoring were at best reduced. The ini-
tial funding as well as the reﬁnancing of non-performing projects were therefore
highly likely. To give a very illustrative example of the aggressive behavior of
banks in giving loans, the popular saying during the credit boom in Uruguay
was: “You could never get less than twice the money you asked for”.1
Therefore, we can think of reﬁnancing of bad projects as a by-product of
lending booms. In fact, this has been mentioned in the literature of lending
booms, for example in Gourinchas et al (2001). They characterize the pattern of
1Cited in Vaz (1999).
2a typical lending boom in Latin America and the rest of the world, identifying
three main ingredients: ﬁnancial liberalization, large capital inﬂows and a failed
program of stabilization based on the exchange rate. The causes of lending booms
are a combination of imperfections in the ﬁnancial architecture and misaligned
incentives at the microeconomic level (e.g. a poor regulation of the ﬁnancial
sector, a dampened monitoring activity, the expectation of a future bailout from
the government) that implies riskier projects are undertaken. Finally, they show
these episodes are accompanied by an investment boom.
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of reﬁnancing of bad projects in a general
equilibrium model. The setting is a neoclassical growth model with overlapping
generations, where physical capital is ﬁnanced through a credit market with ad-
verse selection.
Our results point out that reﬁnancing of ineﬃcient projects (soft budget con-
straint) happens, and that it is more likely during expansions. In other words,
periods of bonanza are characterized by more indulgent credit market conditions
that are translated into more reﬁnancing. In particular, entrepreneurial wealth
plays a key role in this result, since it is the link between the performance of the
economy as a whole and the investment decisions entrepreneurs take. That is,
borrowers net worth during expansions is high and this facilitates lending.
For the general equilibrium setting we draw on Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
who consider the eﬀects of a costly state veriﬁcation setting in the credit mar-
ket on capital investment and on business cycles. We also follow Azariadis and
Chakraborty (1999) who, in a similar model, incorporate a richer speciﬁcation of
veriﬁcation costs. In this sense, our model continues this tradition that analyzes
the relationship between borrowers’ net worth and macroeconomic activity.
Among the literature on soft budget constraints applied to credit markets
there is a set of papers that follows the Dewatripont-Maskin (1995) (DM) model.
The basic setting includes entrepreneurs endowed with good and poor projects,
which are respectively eﬃcient and ineﬃcient, and lenders who provide the initial
investment. Given adverse selection, lenders may initially fund and even reﬁnance
ineﬃcient projects. There is no government, the decision to reﬁnance is linked
3to the existence of sunk costs, which implies a redeﬁnition of the proﬁtability
criterium. Ex-ante, lenders do not want to fund ineﬃcient projects, hence they
are willing to deter poor projects to be submitted through a threat of termination.
However, in the event that lenders have initially funded such projects, that threat
could well not be credible. Ex-post, that is after default occurred, and given that
initial funding is considered as sunk, it can be the case that bringing poor projects
to completion (by injecting new funds) is in everybody’s best business interest.
Lenders would recover some of the incurred losses, while entrepreneurs usually
have enough incentives to see their projects ﬁnished rather than liquidated. Being
aware of these mechanisms at the contracting stage, entrepreneurs endowed with
poor projects may be tempted to submit them.
In such a context of agents rationality and proﬁt maximizing behavior, one
of the puzzles is to ﬁnd out why soft budget constraints are not so prevalent in
market economies. In Dewatripont and Roland (1999) an answer is advanced
stating that hardening soft budget constraints is a matter of institutional design.
In this DM tradition, we ﬁnd models of soft budget constraint applied to dif-
ferent settings, but mainly focused in credit markets. Bergl¨ of and Roland (1997)
point out that reﬁnancing poor projects may crowd out investment when the
average quality of new projects is low enough, hence giving an explanation to the
coexistence of soft budget constraints and credit crunches. Bergara, Ponce and
Zipitr´ ıa (2003) propose a uniﬁed framework to study both political an economic-
induced softening. Mitchell (2000) proposes a new taxonomy of models based on
ex-ante and ex-post eﬃciency criteria that allows to identify two classes of mod-
els. Indeed, not all SBC conﬁgurations incorporate ex-post eﬃciency as in DM,
but it can also be the case of ex-post ineﬃciency. She then provides an example
of the latter, in the context of banking crises, through a model of the SBC where
creditor passivity –under the form of debt rolling over– has the leading role on
explaining the softening.
Therefore, the eﬀects of the syndrome have been studied in a diversity of
environments, to which we should add ﬁscal federalism, decentralization and
political economy. What the above mentioned articles have all in common is
4their microeconomic approach. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the
ﬁrst attempt to incorporate the soft budget constraint syndrome into a dynamic
general equilibrium setting.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the general equi-
librium setting with a description of agents, technologies, preferences and envi-
ronment. Section 2.2 explains the credit market characteristics, and presents the
full information and imperfect information cases. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀects
of the syndrome in the general equilibrium setting: formation of physical capital,
identiﬁcation of winners and losers, and dynamic properties of the model. Section
3.3 tests the empirical predictions of the model. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an overlapping generations (OLG) model with constant population in
which each generation lives two periods. Each individual receives a labor income
when young, and saves in order to consume when old. There are no bequests.
Time is inﬁnite in the forward direction, divided into discrete periods indexed by
t. In what follows we complete the description of this economy.
2.1 Setting
Agents. There is a countable inﬁnity of individuals who are divided into two
classes of agents: an exogenous fraction η is endowed with an investment technol-
ogy through which physical capital is built. These agents are called entrepreneurs.
The remaining fraction 1−η are households, which we call lenders since they are
credit suppliers. Among entrepreneurs we will distinguish between good and poor
ones, as will be deﬁned later. All agents are risk-neutral.
Endowments. Every individual (entrepreneur or lender) has a ﬁxed labor en-
dowment to be used in his ﬁrst period of life. This endowment is constant across
time, Lt = L.
Storage technologies. Entrepreneurs and lenders have diﬀerent access to credit
5markets: There are two storage technologies in this economy, which allow to have
funds when old. The storage technology for lenders yields the gross payoﬀ R > 1,
while the one for entrepreneurs yields only ˆ R < 1.
Preferences. Individuals, either entrepreneurs or lenders, have preferences over
consumption when young and old, represented by the following utility function:
U(ct) + ρEt(dt+1), (1)
where ct is the agent’s consumption when young and dt+1 is her consumption
when old. U is concave and ρ is a discount factor. Note that individuals are
risk-neutral with respect to second period consumption, this assumption allows
us to avoid risk-sharing considerations. Agents’ consumption and savings will
depend then on the relevant interest rate as well as on the wage rate. Calling
c∗
t(R) the optimal consumption of individuals when young, savings are given by:
st = wtL − c
∗
t(R). (2)
We will work under the simplifying assumption that total lenders’ savings in this
economy are high enough so as to fund all projects. In terms of the model, we
suppose that the proportion (1 − η) of lenders is large enough, and this implies
that there is always a positive level of storage and the marginal rate of return for
lenders is R.
Goods and technologies. There are two goods in this economy: an output
(or consumption) good and a capital good. The output good is produced using
a constant returns to scale technology that uses both the capital good and labor
as inputs. We write the production function in per capita terms:
yt = ˜ ￿tf(kt), (3)
where f is concave, kt is per capita physical capital (assumed to be fully depre-
ciated in one period), and ˜ ￿t is a random aggregate productivity shock, which is
i.i.d. over time and continuously distributed over a ﬁnite positive support, with
mean ￿.
6The output good produced in period t can be used during the same period
either to consume, to lend to entrepreneurs, or to store using the storage tech-
nologies.
The physical capital good is produced by entrepreneurs, who own the technol-
ogy that come into the form of “investment projects”. Each entrepreneur has one
investment project, which lasts one period, needs one unit of the output good
as initial investment, and can be either good or poor: while the former yield
positive net present values, the latter do not2. We identify a good entrepreneur
as an entrepreneur who owns a good project, and the same applies for poor en-
trepreneurs.
Assumptions. This economy can be characterized by some features which best
ﬁt to a developing country, in particular in what concerns to imperfect capital
markets. We next present and discuss these assumptions.
First, we work with the assumption that there are rigidities in the credit mar-
ket that translate into the existence of diﬀerent storage technologies for lenders
and entrepreneurs. It is well known that such imperfections are common in many
third world economies, in which some agents have access to international compet-
itive markets, while others have only access to native capital markets. The latter
are characterized by the presence of non-competitive practices, credit constraints,
administrated interest rates, lack of arbitrage, among other imperfections. This
will allow us to limit the space of possibilities of lenders and entrepreneurs.
Second, lenders are disperse and thus passive, they do not have any screening
or monitoring device that would allow them to better discriminate between good
and poor projects.
Third, let us introduce the assumption that entrepreneurial saving, despite
being known at the contracting stage, is not available at that time but only at
an interim stage. We can suppose entrepreneurs have to compulsorily deposit
their savings into the storage technology. This is a straightforward way to make
entrepreneurs ask for credit to ﬁnance their projects. Moreover, lenders have to
2By using the term poor instead of, for example, Bad, we are simply adopting the terminology
used in the literature on soft budget constraint. poor projects are in fact Bad ones.
7entirely ﬁnance the initial investment of projects.
Finally and for simplicity, we rule out any possibility that entrepreneurial
saving may be contracted upon. Again, these last two assumptions are adequate
in the context of underdeveloped economies, characterized by poor institutional
frameworks and ineﬃcient judiciary procedures. In sum, these assumptions serve
the purpose of facilitating the analysis and at the same time they adjust our
setting to the Dewatripont-Maskin basic framework.
t
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Figure 1: The life of agents
Figure 1 illustrates the life span of agents, the main features of the general
equilibrium setting, together with the decisions agents take at each time. At any
period t a new generation of lenders and entrepreneurs are born, who coexist
with period-(t−1) born agents (old agents in period t). Production is done with
the labor endowment of generation t together with the capital built in period
(t−1), and the realized value of the productivity shock ˜ ￿t, as equation (3) estab-
lishes. Young agents receive their labor income and old agents their capital factor
remuneration and the returns from storage. Period-t lenders consume, lend to
entrepreneurs and store. Entrepreneurs consume, store, and borrow from lenders.
At the end of period t, next period physical capital kt+1 is determined. When this
8generation arrives to old, in (t + 1), new production is realized and these agents
receive their capital returns which, added to the returns from storage determines
their consumption when old.
2.2 Credit Market
We now describe the credit market, in which entrepreneurs and lenders meet to
fund projects. In doing so we are in a partial equilibrium framework, this means
the level of entrepreneurial savings sE
t , the productivity shock ˜ ￿t, the wage rate
wt, the expected relative price of capital ˆ qt+1 are all taken as given.
The key feature of this borrower-lender relationship is given by the presence
of asymmetries of information between both types of agents. We assume that at
the contracting stage lenders are not able to distinguish between a good and a
poor project, which is then the entrepreneur’s private information. Lenders face
a pool of applicants for funding. However, they do know that a given project has
a probability α of being good and (1 − α) of being poor.
Both good and poor projects need an initial investment of one unit of the
output good. Since the level of entrepreneurial savings –despite being known– is
not available at the contracting stage, this initial investment is entirely provided
by lenders. A given project –if completed– yields with certainty κ units of physical
capital at the end of the period, to be sold at relative price qt+1 in the next one.
The gross expected payoﬀ of a completed project is then ˆ qt+1κ.
The poor project technology is only distinguished from the good one by the
fact that, at an interim stage, an extra injection of funds is required in order to
bring the project to completion. It is otherwise impossible to continue it, and the
liquidation value is given by a ﬁxed amount RL which is entirely seized by lenders.
In case the project is reﬁnanced, it yields the gross expected payoﬀ ˆ qt+1κ, just
as the good project. At the interim stage, we can distinguish between good and
poor projects, since poor entrepreneurs need extra funding in order to complete
their projects and thus they will ask lenders for reﬁnancing.
Good projects. If the project is good, it produces κ units of physical capital
9at the end of the period, yielding the following expected net present value3:
NPVG = ˆ qt+1κ − R. (4)
Assumption 1 NPVG > 0.
We will insure below that this assumption holds. The fact that the relevant price
is ˆ qt+1 also simpliﬁes the analysis, since all the decisions taken in t depend only
on expectations about the next-period productivity shock (i.e. on ￿, which we
assume ﬁxed), rather than on its actual value (i.e. on ˜ ￿t+1).
Poor projects. The amount of extra funds needed by poor projects will in turn
depend on poor entrepreneurs’ own characteristics: we assume that the class of
poor entrepreneurs is itself not homogeneous. This heterogeneity comes from the
fact that each poor entrepreneur has an idiosyncratic characteristic that reﬂects
his ability to complete the project. At the contracting stage, a representative
entrepreneur of this class knows he has a poor project, but he does not know
how well he will perform in taking the project to completion. He needs to invest
himself into the project, learn by doing, in order to know more and ﬁnd out his
level of ability. Hence, we assume that abilities are unknown at the contracting
stage, and that this is particularly true for poor entrepreneurs themselves. At the
interim stage, this process of information acquisition is completed and abilities
become publicly observed4.
Then, diﬀerent abilities will be translated into diﬀerent needs of funds at the
interim stage, in a way that a highly skilled entrepreneur needs less funds to
complete the project. We have thus an opposite correspondence between these
two variables. poor entrepreneurs are indexed by i, and ability (extra funding) is
represented by the parameter θi. Let us assume that it is uniformly distributed
in the interval [θ
¯
, ¯ θ] among poor entrepreneurs, with ¯ θ − θ
¯
= 1.
3We should interpret “present” as corresponding to values at period t + 1.
4Another interpretation for this feature would be an exogenous liquidity shock aﬀecting poor
entrepreneurs during the ﬁrst period, as in Aghion et al (2005).
10Assumption 2 NPVPi < 0 ∀ θi
5.
The expected net present value of agent i’s poor project is
NPVPi = ˆ qt+1κ − R(1 + θi) (5)
It is then ex-ante ineﬃcient to reﬁnance a poor project, and it follows that an
entrepreneur with a low value of θ is “less ineﬃcient” in the continuation activity.
However, under some circumstances it may be the case that lenders are willing
to reﬁnance poor projects at the interim stage. Such a situation describes a soft
budget constraint episode, in which there is a discrepancy between the ex-ante
and ex-post criteria: despite the project is poor and thus it should be liquidated,
it may occur that it could be eﬃcient ex-post, i.e. once default occurred and
the initial investment is considered as sunk. In such a case, in their quest to
recover some of the initial sunk investment, lenders will only pay attention to the
continuation and liquidation payoﬀs, the latter given by a ﬁxed amount RL < 1.
Assumption 3 ˆ qt+1κ − Rθ
¯
< RL.
This assumption tells us that –absent any entrepreneurial contribution– it is
optimal for lenders to liquidate poor projects, since in such a case the liquidation
payoﬀ is higher than the continuation payoﬀ6. The reﬁnancing decision will be
then based on an entrepreneur’s contribution: the entrepreneur is called to put
up a part of his savings (˜ sE
t ) in order to be reﬁnanced.
Assumption 4 The veriﬁable payoﬀ is a fraction γ of the total gross payoﬀ.
We are assuming that entrepreneurs, given their direct involvement in the project’s
management, are able to deviate to their pockets a ﬁxed proportion (1 − γ) of
the projects gross payoﬀ.
5The expected value of the random shock is set to ￿ = 1. Then we assume R




κf0(ακη), which is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of both Good and Poor projects. This
is valid for some reasonable parameter conﬁgurations.
6To guarantee Assumption 3 holds, and given the assumptions on ￿ it is suﬃcient to add
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Figure 2: Credit market timing
In sum, the timing is presented in Figure 2. At the contracting stage, lenders
and entrepreneurs meet to fund projects. The level of current entrepreneurial
savings is publicly observed but it is not yet available, so it cannot be used to be
invested into projects and thus lenders provide the entire initial investment. En-
trepreneurs’ abilities are unknown for every agent –including poor entrepreneurs
themselves– but their distribution is common knowledge. Both lenders and en-
trepreneurs take the decisions of respectively fund any project, and submit their
projects for funding. At the interim stage, poor projects can be distinguished
from good ones, and each poor entrepreneur is characterized by his level of abil-
ity. Lenders ask for an entrepreneurial contribution in order to reﬁnance such
projects, otherwise there is liquidation for a fraction σ, to be deﬁned below. Abil-
ities, together with the level of entrepreneurial savings, may determine that some
poor entrepreneurs will be able to get reﬁnancing.
122.2.1 The perfect information case
Let us ﬁrst introduce the perfect information case. For ease of notation and given
that we are in partial equilibrium, we refer to the gross payoﬀ of a terminated
project as RS = ˆ qt+1κ, we use the subscript S for successful projects (either good
projects or poor projects that are reﬁnanced). If the project is liquidated, we keep
RL. We also use superscripts to denote the agent (lenders: L, entrepreneurs: E).
When lenders can observe the type of projects entrepreneurs have, they will
only fund good projects. Lenders’ expected payoﬀ writes:
Π
L
S = γRS − R > 0. (6)
Entrepreneurs get the remaining share (1 − γ).
The supply of physical capital is given by the following curve, that we call
hereafter the SS curve:
kt+1 = ακη. (SS)
The next-period stock of (per capita) capital kt+1 is ﬁxed, and is given by the
units of physical capital a good project can create (κ), multiplied by the total
number of such projects in the population, αη. On the other side, the demand
curve DD is given by the equality between the expected price of capital and its
expected marginal productivity.
ˆ qt+1 = ￿f
0(kt+1). (DD)
This curve is downward sloping since f is concave, and recall that ￿ is the mean
of the productivity shock. In each period t, ˆ qt+1 and kt+1 are determined as the
intersection of the supply and demand curves of capital, as Figure 3 shows.
The dynamics in the full information case are simple: since no period-t vari-
able is involved in SS and DD, both the expected price and the quantity of
physical capital will be constant over time. Investment is then ﬁxed, and re-
minding that labor supply so is, the only origin of ﬂuctuations comes from the
aggregate productivity shock ˜ ￿t. With full information, all good projects are






Figure 3: Equilibrium in the perfect information case
2.2.2 The asymmetric information case
When entrepreneurs types are not observable, lenders decide at the contracting
stage whether to fund any project they face, and entrepreneurs decide whether to
submit their projects for funding. At the interim stage, when all the information
becomes publicly observed, lenders decide on extending extra funding to poor
projects, while poor entrepreneurs themselves decide on continuing or not.
Lenders’ ﬁnancing and reﬁnancing decisions. Lenders ﬁnancing decisions
depend on the mix of good and poor projects existing in the economy as well
as on the reﬁnancing conditions that will appear at the interim stage. For a
particular lender to ﬁnance any project, the net expected payoﬀ from funding













The total net expected payoﬀ are composed by the net expected payoﬀ from
funding a good project (with probability α) and the net expected payoﬀ from
funding a poor project (with probability (1 − α)). Among them, some will be
liquidated, with probability σ (to be deﬁned below). The remaining poor projects
14will be able to be reﬁnanced.
The expected payoﬀ from funding a good project is given by
Π
L
G = γRS − R > 0. (8)
For poor projects, we need to analyze what happens at the interim stage,
when lenders observe the type of entrepreneur they have funded. Recall that it is
at this time possible to distinguish within poor entrepreneurs according to their
level of ability. Therefore, lenders have to take a decision concerning reﬁnancing
or liquidating them. At a ﬁrst sight, taking into account that a poor project is
–by deﬁnition– a negative expected present valued one, liquidation would seem
like the best strategy for lenders. However, given the sunk nature of the initial
investment, it could be the case for reﬁnancing. In order for continuation to
occur, and taking into account there is no possibility of reﬁnancing without an
entrepreneurial contribution, the entrepreneur should contribute with an amount
˜ sE
t of her savings, borrowing the remaining amount θi − ˜ sE
t from the lender.
Entrepreneurs may then make the lender’s reﬁnancing payoﬀ greater than the
liquidation payoﬀ, forcing the project’s continuation whenever
γRS − R(θi − ˜ s
E
t ) ≥ RL. (9)
From the point of view of lenders, an entrepreneurial contribution that makes this
inequality binding would be enough to extend reﬁnancing7. Let us then deﬁne,
for a given level of entrepreneurial savings sE
t the threshold θs as the marginal
poor entrepreneur, that is, the one who leaves the lender indiﬀerent between










It follows that any poor entrepreneur with level of ability θi ≤ θs has enough assets
so as to be reﬁnanced. Let us call them high-ability entrepreneurs, whereas the
contrary applies for θi > θs, which we call low-ability entrepreneurs.
7We assume that, if indiﬀerent between continuation or liquidation, lenders decide to go
ahead with the project.
15With the above facts, deﬁne σ(sE























t ) − θ
¯
. (12)
Note that a higher value of entrepreneurial savings means a higher fraction of
poor projects that get reﬁnancing.
Given that lenders are passive, the necessary amount ˜ sE
t that an entrepreneur
θi ≤ θs must contribute with in order to be reﬁnanced is given by
˜ s
E




which follows from equation (9). On the other hand, lenders will cover the re-
maining






Table 1 summarizes the ﬁndings of this subsection8. There is then poor projects’
Table 1: Decisions at interim stage




,θs] (1 − α)(1 − σ) ref. ˜ sE
t (θi) θi − ˜ sE
t (θi)
θi ∈ (θs, ¯ θ] (1 − α)σ liq. − −
continuation (i.e. soft budget constraint) for the ﬁrst group of poor entrepreneurs,
and liquidation for the other one. In case of reﬁnancing, lenders’ interim con-
tribution is ﬁxed, whereas entrepreneurs’ contribution is increasing in types. In
8For ease of notation, we omit hereafter the dependence of σ on entrepreneurial savings sE
t .
16the second group, –high levels of θ– there is liquidation, so no contributions are
involved.
The expected payoﬀ of lenders who ﬁnanced a low-ability entrepreneur, θi ∈
(θs, ¯ θ] is given by
Π
L
liq = RL − R < 0,





ref = γRS − R
h





where ˆ θ denotes the expected value of θ conditional on θi belonging to the relevant
range for high-ability entrepreneurs. Note that, substituting the expression for
ˆ θ − ˜ sE
t (ˆ θ) –see equation (14)–, we can rewrite this equation as
Π
L






= RL − R < 0. (15)
This is the same expected payoﬀ that a lender would get by terminating the
project, since entrepreneurs need to contribute up to the point in which lenders
are just indiﬀerent between continuation and liquidation. With these ingredients,
we can rewrite lenders participation constraint at the contracting stage , equation
(7), as
Π
L = α(γRS − R) + (1 − α)(RL − R) ≥ 0. (16)
Equation (16) then governs lenders decision to fund projects at the contracting
stage. This decision depends on the mix of good and poor projects in the en-
trepreneurs population given by the exogenous parameter α, as well as the payoﬀs
RS and RL.
Entrepreneurs’ investment decisions. The decision that an entrepreneur
has to take at the contracting stage is whether to submit her project for funding.
Given our setting it is straightforward to see that a good entrepreneur will always
submit her project: by doing so she gets a proportion (1 − γ) of the gross payoﬀ
without contributing to funding. Formally, she will submit it as long as
Π
E
G = (1 − γ)RS ≥ 0. (17)
17For a poor entrepreneur, the decision to submit her project at the contracting
stage will depend on the probability of being reﬁnanced at the interim stage, and
in such a case on the opportunity costs of the funds she will have to put. Recall
that entrepreneurs have a primitive storage technology available, and that at the
contracting stage they do not know their levels of ability, which is only revealed
at the interim stage.
The poor entrepreneur expected payoﬀ if she submits her project is com-
posed by two terms: First, if she turns out to be a low-ability entrepreneur,
with probability σ(sE
t ), her project will be liquidated so her payoﬀ will be zero.






, she will be allowed to continue provided she contributes
at interim with an amount ˜ sE
t (θi). Then, the poor entrepreneur’s participation
constraint at the contracting stage is given by
(1 − σ)
h





This individual rationality constraint tells us that, in order that a poor en-
trepreneur submit her project when young, the expected payoﬀ from it must
be greater than zero. Notice that if the liquidation probability is equal to one,
these entrepreneurs are not willing to submit their projects. They know ex-ante
that they will be liquidated for sure. This equation illustrates expectations of a
future bailout, their decision will depend on the current level of entrepreneurial
savings, sE
t .
At the interim stage, we saw lenders may extend reﬁnancing to those poor
entrepreneurs called high-ability ones. Once entrepreneurs’ abilities become ob-
served, these entrepreneurs will be willing to be reﬁnanced if the gross expected
payoﬀ from the project exceeds their opportunity cost of funds, i.e. if
(1 − γ)RS ≥ ˆ R˜ s
E




In order that every high-ability poor entrepreneur may be willing to continue, it
must be the case that
(1 − γ)RS ≥ ˆ Rs
E
t ,
18since the maximum value of ˜ se
t(θi) is sE
t , when θi = θs(sE
t ).
Equilibrium in the credit market




ii. (1 − γ)RS ≥ 0
iii. (1 − σ)
h




iv. γRS − R(θi − ˜ sE
t ) ≥ RL.
v. (1 − γ)RS ≥ ˆ RsE
t .
there exists an equilibrium with soft budget constraint.
Proof. The ﬁrst equation is lenders’ participation constraint at the contracting
stage, equation (16), it states that in order to ﬁnance any project, the propor-
tion of good projects must be higher than a threshold α. The second and third
equations are the entrepreneurs participation constraints at the contracting stage.
The fourth equation is the continuation rule for poor projects, which acts as a
participation constraint for lenders at the interim stage. Finally, the last equation
is the participation constraint of poor entrepreneurs at interim. If all of these
conditions hold, we have an equilibrium in which all project are initially funded
and some poor projects end up reﬁnanced, i.e. the equilibrium entails soft budget
constraint. 2
In the soft budget constraint equilibrium, lenders reﬁnance a fraction 1 −
σ(sE
t ) = θs(sE
t ) − θ
¯
of poor projects. The asymmetric information structure of
the model entails the initial funding of poor projects. Moreover, some of them
are reﬁnanced and thus completed, despite being ineﬃcient from an ex-ante point
of view. Finally, for the remaining poor entrepreneurs, in a proportion equal to
19σ(sE
t ), there will be liquidation, since they are ineﬃcient even from an ex-post
perspective.
Size of the bailout. Given the equilibrium with soft budget constraint, it is
interesting to calculate the amount of funds lenders put at the interim stage. This
will give us the size of the bailout poor entrepreneurs receive from lenders. We
have found that extra funding may be extended to high-ability poor entrepreneurs,
i.e. for ability levels θi ∈ [θ
¯
,θs(sE
t )]. The bailout size b is an increasing function
of entrepreneurial savings sE
t , and is given by
b(s
E











This measure of the ﬁnancial help extended to poor entrepreneurs can reveal itself
helpful on comparing the model’s results with the empirical evidence. For that,
we can propose a relative indicator which is the ratio between the bailout size and
the total number of funded projects (η). We can also compare the bailout size
with the number of good projects (αη). As a macroeconomic indicator, aggregate
(per capita) credit is given by
Ct =
n











that is, total per capita credit is composed by the initial investment plus the
funding at the interim stage given to poor projects, which positively depends on
entrepreneurial savings. It is straightforward to obtain the Credit to GDP ratio,
Ct/yt.
3 Assessing on the role of SBC in general equi-
librium
3.1 Physical Capital Formation
In this section we show how the expected price and quantity of physical capital
are determined. In any period t, the inherited per capita capital stock kt is given,
20labor supply is inelastic, so output is determined by the production function and
the realization of the productivity shock ˜ ￿t, according to equation (3). Therefore,
wages and both entrepreneurs and lenders’ period-t savings are determined, as
well as θs(sE
t ).
Given the presence of asymmetries of information in the credit market, we
know from Proposition 1 it can be the case that some poor projects get reﬁ-
nanced and thus completed. This means the supply of physical capital available
to use in the next period (kt+1) is the weighted sum of the units of capital (κ)
produced by good entrepreneurs and those produced by poor entrepreneurs that
get reﬁnancing. The new capital supply curve, that we call S0S0 for the imperfect
information case, writes as follows
kt+1 =
n
α + (1 − α)[θ
s(s
E





which is an upward sloping curve in the space (kt+1, ˆ qt+1) since θs(sE
t ) depends
on ˆ qt+1. This is the key dynamic equation that connects the economic conditions
of any two periods. The demand curve for capital DD is just the same as in the
perfect information case,
ˆ qt+1 = ￿f
0(kt+1). (DD)
In each period t, ˆ qt+1 and kt+1 are determined as the intersection of the supply
and demand curves of capital (see Figure 4). From the S0S0 curve it is easy to
see that, in the presence of asymmetric information in the credit market, the
equilibrium may imply a level of physical capital strictly greater than the perfect
information one. This is the case when reﬁnancing of poor projects occurs, i.e.
when θs(sE
t ) > θ
¯
.
This mechanism has limits, though. On one hand, if the level of entrepreneurial
savings is high enough, then all poor projects would get reﬁnancing and physical
capital would reach its maximum, κη. Indeed, any extra increase in savings would
not have any consequence and in such a case, we lose the relationship that links
savings to the degree of softness. On the other hand, were savings suﬃciently low








Figure 4: Equilibrium in the soft budget constraint case
not have consequences for reﬁnancing, and physical capital would remain at its
minimum, the perfect information level kpi = ακη.
3.2 Properties
3.2.1 Cyclical sensibility
In a simple exercise of comparative statics, consider the eﬀects of a rise in current
production following a positive and temporary shock. Let us suppose that the
initial situation is such that the level of entrepreneurial savings is low enough
such that θs(sE
t ) = θ
¯
, that is, all poor entrepreneurs are low-ability ones, and
there is liquidation for any poor submitted project. We are then reproducing the
perfect information outcome, kt+1 = ακη. The situation is illustrated in Figure
5. The direct eﬀect is a rise in current entrepreneurs’ (and lenders’) savings,
and consequently an increase in the number of poor projects that are reﬁnanced,
since θs(sE
t ) grows. This in turn shifts the S0S0 curve to the right, and the within-
period equilibrium is obtained for a higher level of capital kt+1.
Notice, by the contrary, that a negative shock occurring under the same initial
22situation as the one described above9, would have no eﬀect on investment. This
is so since all poor entrepreneurs, that are already rationed, would not be able
to get reﬁnancing. This allows us to propose the following:
Proposition 2 The soft budget constraint problem is more binding during ex-











Figure 5: Eﬀects of a productivity shock
The shock provokes an increase in period-T entrepreneurial wealth, measured
in this setting by entrepreneurial savings sE
t . The consequences of this rise are
diﬀerent in both cases. In the perfect information case investment is ﬁxed so
that any shock aﬀecting savings is absorbed by consumption and inventories.
In the imperfect information case, it turns out that the shock has an eﬀect on
investment (kt+1), that grows as immediate eﬀect following the increased balance
sheet positions of entrepreneurs. This eﬀect persists thereafter through a higher
than steady state level of entrepreneurial savings. The opposite occurs for the
9We think in a small negative and temporary shock, such that it does not imply a credit
crunch for good projects too.
23expected price of physical capital (ˆ qt+1), that acts as counterbalance to recover the
steady state. We hence ﬁnd persistence of the shock, due to the channel between
entrepreneurial savings and the decisions to reﬁnance, as well as procyclicality
since expansions tend to amplify the soft budget constraint syndrome.
In what concerns the inter-temporal equilibrium characterization, no general
steady state existence results are obtained, but we can provide examples with spe-
ciﬁc production functions and parameter conﬁgurations for which an equilibrium
exists. This is done in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Winners and losers
We have seen that the main outcome of the syndrome on our setting is an excess
of capital compared to the perfect information case. We now investigate what
are the eﬀects of this result in this general equilibrium setting. For that, we
could take diﬀerent avenues. For instance, and going beyond the model proposed
here, imagine a broader setting which includes two sectors, one which faces the
syndrome and the other that does not. In that case, reﬁnancing of poor projects in
the ﬁrst sector may deviate resources that could have been invested in the second
sector. Similar results are found in Bergl¨ of and Roland (1997), where lenders have
the option to either reﬁnance poor projects or ﬁnance new ones. If the average
quality of new projects is low, lenders will reﬁnance old ones. Consequently there
is credit rationing in new investment together with soft budget constraint.
A second avenue, now within our model, consists in calculating the second pe-
riod expected consumption of individuals. The class of entrepreneurs is positively
aﬀected by the presence of soft budget constraint, since their expected payoﬀs
from projects are always at least equal than their outside option, the primitive
storage technology that returns the gross rate ˆ R < 1. Indeed, good entrepreneurs
always make positive expected proﬁts, while poor entrepreneurs –even in the case
they are liquidated– get at least the rate ˆ R.
Lenders do suﬀer from it, since they may fund poor projects and this invest-
ment may yield a negative return.
24Proposition 3 Let c
pi
t+1 and cii
t+1 be the expected second period consumption of





Proof. See the Appendix.
In the soft budget constraint economy, then, lenders when old can consume
less compared to what they would obtain in an economy with perfect information,
in which only good projects are ﬁnanced.
3.2.3 Dynamics
As we have mentioned in sub-section 2.2.1, the perfect information case presents
no interesting dynamics: the capital stock is ﬁxed and production only varies with
the productivity shock ˜ ￿t. In the imperfect information case, the capital supply
curve S0S0 depends on current entrepreneurial savings sE
t which implies that this
curve will react to changes in period-t capital stock, as well as to productivity
shocks, since both aﬀect the marginal productivity of labor and thus the level of
savings. There is no such eﬀect in the perfect information setting.
Consider again the eﬀects of a positive (temporary) shock occurred in period
T. If the economy is in its steady state (assuming by the moment that a steady
state exists) the immediate eﬀect of the shock is an increase of entrepreneurs’
savings and then, via the S0S0 curve, the capital available in T + 1 will increase
above the level it would have had without the shock. This will in turn increase
the next period entrepreneurial savings over its steady state level, propagating
the initial eﬀect. The expected price of capital ˆ qT+1 will decrease in period T, and
eventually it will increase enough so as to compensate the eﬀects of the shock,
and the steady state is recovered. A negative shock would have the opposite
eﬀects, i.e. a persistent investment downturn. Since we are unable to say more
at this stage, we next propose an example with functional forms.
Cobb-Douglas, uniform ability economy. In order to know more about
the dynamic characteristics of the model, we next consider an example based
25on a Cobb-Douglas production function with parameter β and we assume the
distribution of ability is uniform. Equation (3) is then
yt = ˜ ￿tk
β
t .
Recall the capital supply (S0S0) curve
kt+1 =
￿
α + (1 − α)[θ
s(s
E





The capital demand curve (DD) is:
ˆ qt+1 = ￿βk
β−1
t+1 . (DD)




t = ˜ ￿t(1 − β)k
β
t L,






γˆ qt+1κ − RL
R
+ ˜ ￿t(1 − β)k
β
t L.
Next, let us insert both the expression for ˆ qt+1 given by equation (DD), and that
for θs(Se


























i.e. the general form of the dynamic path is
kt = H(kt+1)
To advance one step further in the analysis, it is necessary to impose values
to the parameters. Let us thus next conﬁgure a parametrical example for this
Cobb-Douglas case. Those values are presented in Table 2.
26Table 2: Choice of parameters
Parameter Value Deﬁnition
η 0.30 % of entrepreneurs in population
α 0.70 % of good projects among entrepreneurs
κ 15 physical capital units that yields a completed project
γ 0.85 fraction of projects’ gross payoﬀ to lenders
θi U[1,2] distribution of ability among poor entrepreneurs
RL 0.80 liquidation value of projects
R 1.10 gross return from storage (lenders)
ˆ R 0.70 gross return from storage (entrepreneurs)
β 0.30 capital parameter in Cobb-Douglas production function
￿ = ˜ ￿t 1.00 no shocks
L 1.00 labor endowment
For this parameter conﬁguration, all the imposed restrictions for existence of
a SBC equilibrium are satisﬁed. This means that lenders fund all projects at the
contracting stage, all poor entrepreneurs submit their projects for funding, and
some of them gets reﬁnancing at the interim stage. Given the assumptions we
made to guarantee the existence of both good and poor projects, this analysis is
restricted for an interval of capital kt ∈ (kmin,kmax).
Using equation (20) with kt = kt+1 = kss, ˜ ￿t = ￿ and our parameter set, we
found that there exists a unique deterministic steady state (see Figure 6), and that
kss ∈ (kmin,kmax). Moreover, this steady state is characterized by the presence
of soft budget constraint reﬁnancing of poor entrepreneurs. Further simulations
have revealed that those results are quiet robust to the parameter choice. We
wanted to know how well this model behaves when we modify some key param-
eters. In particular, we have conducted examples varying the parameter α that
accounts for the proportion of good projects in the population of entrepreneurs.





Figure 6: Intertemporal equilibrium existence - SBC case
age points at each time, and we found existence of steady states with soft budget
constraint equilibria, even for a low 40% of good projects. For lower values of α,
the participation constraint of lenders at the contracting stage is not satisﬁed.
We have also modiﬁed the parameter η, the percentage of entrepreneurs in the to-
tal population. This resulted in a more constrained range: steady state existence
with soft budget constraint is guaranteed for η ∈ [0.2,0.3]. Finally, combining
both ranges i.e. α ∈ [0.4,0.7] and η ∈ [0.2,0.3], we still ﬁnd existence. We con-
clude then that there exists a relatively large range of two crucial parameters for
which there exists steady states characterized by soft budget constraint.
3.3 Econometric speciﬁcation
In this section we analyze empirically a prediction of the model, the fact that the
response of credit facing output expansions is larger in SBC economies compared
to economies in which constraints are “hard”. To do that we propose a panel of
32 countries for the 1972-1999 period, with annual data. The data is presented
in Table 3, countries include developed economies, Latin American countries and
28South East Asia countries.
Credit (C) –expressed in local currency in current terms– comprises claims on the
nonbanking private sector by commercial banks and other ﬁnancial institutions,
lines 22d and 42d of International Financial Statistics, IMF. The Gross Domestic
Product (Y ) is also obtained from IFS (line 99d). We denote the growth rate
of real GDP per capita as ∆ ln Yi,t, using data from the Penn World Table.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
C/Y 903 .5583 .3382 .08887 1.77132
∆ ln Y 952 .0284 .0208 -.07347 .147185
Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.
We run the following regression, using the Fixed Eﬀects model:
(C/Y )i,t = αi+β1∆ ln Yi,t+β2(∆ ln Yi,t×DummyLat)+β3(∆ ln Yi,t×Contracti)+ui,t
We explain the credit to GDP ratio using per capita GDP growth. This al-
lows to control for the impact of rapidly growing economies on the demand for
credit. Since in our model the SBC phenomenon arises in economies with low lev-
els of screening and monitoring, we consider that this can have been the case for
many Latin American countries. We then include the variable DummyLat which
adopts the value one for these countries, expecting to obtain higher responses of
the Credit to GDP ratio facing output booms, i.e. β2 > 0.
29Table 4: Explaining the Credit to GDP ratio
Dependent variable: Credit to GDP ratio, 1972-1999
Coeﬃcient Model
————————————————
I II III IV
αi 0.656∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.740∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
∆ ln Yi,t -3.409∗∗ -5.885∗∗ 7.633∗∗ 3.588∗
(0.308) (0.408) (1.218) (1.661)
∆ ln Yi,t × DummyLat – 5.191∗∗ – 2.738∗∗
(0.590) (0.771)
∆ ln Yi,t × Contracti – – -4.822∗∗ -3.564∗∗
(0.507) (0.615)
Observations 821 821 821 821
We also include the crossed variable (∆ ln Yi,t × Contracti), where “Con-
tract” measures the relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored
and complications presented by language and mentality diﬀerences. Scored 0-
4, with higher scores for superior quality; average over 1980-95; Source: Knack
and Keefer (1995), using data from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence
(BERI). We guess that a better institutional framework, captured by higher val-
ues of “Contract”, would be translated by a lower response of the Credit to GDP
ratio. We are thus expecting the coeﬃcient β3 to be negative. The results of this
regression are presented in Table 4, where we see we ﬁnd the expected parame-
ter signs: Latin American countries present a higher response of credit following
30output growth, whereas the qualitative variable indicates countries with a better
institutional environment show a lower response of credit.
4 Conclusions
We have constructed a model in which soft budget constraint phenomena appear
as a result of adverse selection in credit markets. Any ex-ante liquidation threat
by the part of lenders may not be credible for some levels of entrepreneurial sav-
ings, which determines that poor projects are submitted to funding and some
of them get reﬁnancing. The model then reproduces one of the main ingredi-
ents of this syndrome: when expectations of a future bailout are positive, then
liquidations threats may not be credible enough so as to deter entrance of poor
projects.
The main outcome of the model is to show the problem is more binding along
the business cycle, i.e. when entrepreneurs net worth is high. The fraction of
poor projects that is reﬁnanced, total credit, investment, and the size of the
bailout, are all increasing functions of entrepreneurial savings. This can be seen
as further evidence to the rapid growth in the credit to the private sector that
deﬁnes a lending boom, and to the increase in investment that accompanies such
episodes.
Leaving the negative consequences of lending booms to the rest of the economy
aside, we may ask: is all of this that bad? To answer this question, we have shown
that in the soft budget constraint equilibrium the class of lenders loses in terms
of second period consumption, compared to the perfect information equilibrium.
Therefore, there is a cost in terms of welfare at least for some individuals.
The model is based on assumptions that best ﬁt to economies with poor insti-
tutions (no screening, no monitoring, weak enforcement of contracts). Therefore,
when testing the main prediction of the model, we were expecting to ﬁnd that
countries with poorer institutional frameworks had higher responses of the credit
to GDP ratio facing increases in GDP. Our guess was that Latin American coun-
tries were an example of such countries, and the regression conﬁrmed that. We
31also found that the credit to GDP ratio overreact in a lower degree to changes in
GDP in countries with a relative good environment for doing business.
Finally, policy recommendations are straightforward: concerning the environ-
ment in which contracts are settled, regulation should be improved. At the same
time, we could think on a tax to entrepreneurs. This would have the eﬀect of
lowering their savings during expansions to in turn decrease the proportion of
poor projects that get reﬁnancing.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us deﬁne the weights δ, which express the fractions
of lenders that ﬁnance projects (good and poor in all of its variants), or that
simply use the storage technology:
• δ3 =
αη















1−η share of lenders who simply store their savings.
Notice the dependence of δ1 and δ2 on entrepreneurial savings, since those are
functions of σ(sE
t ). The expected second period consumption of lenders in the
imperfect information case (cii












In turn, these expected levels of consumption are given by the sum of the gross
payoﬀs from projects and from storage. In the case of funding a good project,
the expected second-period consumption writes:
c
G
t+1 = γˆ qt+1κ + R(st − 1).
Those lenders that funded low-ability entrepreneurs (and hence their projects are
liquidated at interim) get:
c
P,low
t+1 = RL + R(st − 1).
When lenders have funded a high-ability entrepreneur, the project is completed
and thus their payoﬀ is:
c
P,high
t+1 = γˆ qt+1κ + R(st − 1 −
γˆ qt+1κ − RL
R
) = RL + R(st − 1).















34On the other hand, in the perfect information case (pi), lenders only fund
good projects, so their expected second period consumption c
pi





t+1 + (1 − δ3)c
Stor
t+1 .
We next show that the expected second period consumption of lenders is greater

















which can be re written, using the above facts as
(1 − δ3 − δ0)c
Stor
t+1 > (δ1 + δ2)c
P,low
t+1 ,






This condition holds by construction, then we have proven that c
pi
t+1 > cii
t+1. 2
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